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Independence and the
Poverty of Political Leaders
in Hong Kong*

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Decolonization Without Independence and the Poverty of Political Leaders in Hong Kong

Abstract

In the eve of sovereignty transfer, Hong Kong suffers from both the dearth of political leaders and their ineffectiveness. Several factors contribute to the poverty of political leaders: (1) the nature of colonial governance, (2) the character of the Chinese community, (3) the institutional features of the local socio-political system, (4) the constraint of time, (5) the inconsistent and incoherent leadership policy of the British and Chinese governments, and (6) the elusive and erratic mass support for leaders. The overall effects of these factors are: (1) multiple channels of leadership recruitment, (2) their inadequacy to the formation of strong leadership, (3) the fragmentation and instability of leaders, (4) strong need of leaders to depend on political patronage from above, and (5) individualistic leadership behavior.

UNLIKE other former British colonies, the end of colonial rule in Hong Kong will not take the form of independence either through peaceful or violent means. Instead, according to an agreement between Britain and China, China will restore sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. China also promises Hong Kong the preservation of the capitalist system, a high degree of self-government and 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong.' In the Basic Law promulgated by the Chinese Government in April 1990, the arrangements whereby China will delegate power to Hong Kong after the resumption of sovereignty are spelled out in detail.¹

Nevertheless, with only seven years remaining before 1997, Hong Kong is still in search of an organized group of political leaders who can be trusted by the people of Hong Kong and the two governments to make the arrangements stipulated in the Sino-British agreement and the Basic Law work. Though not with the same criteria in mind, both governments are making efforts to identify the future political leaders for Hong Kong. In the case of Britain, the support of popular indigenous leaders is desperately needed to bolster the diminishing authority of the Hong Kong government in the transitional period.

China's demand for indigenous leaders in Hong Kong is even more real. In face of widespread fear and mistrust of China in Hong Kong, it will be disastrous for Hong Kong if China is forced to exercise direct rule over the territory for want of effective indigenous leaders. If the formula of 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong' is to be successfully implemented, indigenous leaders capable of administering the place under the framework of the Basic Law have to be available.

To the people of Hong Kong, the absence of trustworthy leaders is sorely felt. When queried about whether they had in mind trustworthy political leaders in Hong Kong in 1988, 69.9 per cent of the respondents in a territory-wide sample replied in the negative. Only 16.2 per cent ($N = 64$) answered affirmatively. The overall picture is one of lack of trusted political leaders among the Hong Kong people.²

A variety of factors, however, makes it quite unlikely that a large number of trusted and organized political leaders will emerge in the transitional period. In all likelihood, a fair number of loosely organized political leaders can be found, but they can manage to enjoy only a limited degree of trust and support by the people. Because of their limited popularity with the masses, the support and trust they can obtain from Britain and China will be correspondingly limited. The operation of these factors makes it quite difficult for a political aspirant to pursue a political career in Hong Kong. At the same time individualistic leadership behavior is encouraged, making stable alliances among leaders and the formation of strong political organizations very difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, to forge strong linkages between the leaders and the masses would be an arduous task.

These factors pertain to the nature of colonial governance and the character of the Chinese community of Hong Kong. They also have to do with the structural features of the social-political system, which affect the amount and type of political power available and the ways and means to obtain it. As a pertinent factor, the constraints of time also play a significant role in the relations among leaders and between them and the masses. The lack of a stable and coherent leadership policy on the part of Britain and China also takes its toll on leadership formation. Likewise, the political attitudes of the Hong Kong people are not conducive to the emergence of popular leaders. The orientation and behavior of Hong Kong's leaders are a reflection of these factors, and in turn impinge upon them. Changes in these factors can be expected in the future, but in the transitional period at least, the

outlook on political leadership in Hong Kong is not bright at all.

Historical Background: Colonial Governance

The way Hong Kong has been ruled as a British colony is quite unique. This uniqueness has shaped the special nature of colonial governance in Hong Kong right from its inception. In the first place, Hong Kong was acquired by the British in mid-nineteenth century not for the sake of territorial gain nor for the natural resources (in fact there weren't any) that could be exploited for economic benefits. In accordance with Palmerstonian liberalism which exalted freedom of trade as the cardinal political goal, Hong Kong was wrested from the moribund Manchu regime for the purpose of advancing and safeguarding British economic interests in the Far East, particularly in China. Hong Kong also provided a haven for the British merchants who refused to subject themselves to the arbitrary and 'barbarous' Chinese law. To achieve these purposes, the British had to establish a governmental system along Western lines.

Secondly, Hong Kong was a colony built on a territory without a settled population (except for the tiny population of the New Territories). This had several implications for colonial rule: (a) The colonial government could not rely upon indigenous leaders as collaborators of colonial rule. Hence, Lord Lugard's strategy of the dual mandate could not be practised. Indirect rule through local leaders was ruled out from the very beginning.³ (b) On the other hand, colonial rule was not under the threat of strong indigenous leaders who might mobilize their followings against the colonizers.⁴ (c) The fact that the colonial government was established prior to the arrival of the colonized means that most of the Chinese people who later moved to Hong Kong subscribed to colonial rule voluntarily, primarily for economic and political reasons. They posed no threat to colonial rule. Not only were they not interested in politics, they were also quite averse to involvement with the colonial government.

Thirdly, Hong Kong's geographical proximity to China and the predominant Chinese majority in the colony made China a ubiquitous factor in the mind of the colonial government. In order to avert nationalist appeals by the Chinese government to the compatriots in Hong Kong and to deny it the excuse to intervene in local politics

because of harsh colonial rule, benign and paternalistic rule over the Chinese was imperative. And this was made easier by the fact that enlightened rule had become part of colonial ideology by mid-19th century. Ironically, China also acted to sustain colonial rule in a peculiar way. Before 1949, the weakness of China prevented her from recovering sovereignty over Hong Kong. After 1949, the Communist government tolerated the existence of the British colony for economic and diplomatic reasons. But China was also steadfastly opposed to Hong Kong becoming an independent state. Within Hong Kong, the Westernized Chinese elite were against Chinese takeover, while the common people, many of whom have fled from China, preferred colonial rule to rule by the Communists. China hence indirectly 'subsidized' colonial rule by immunizing the colonial government from the threat of anti-colonial assaults. And the costs of colonial rule for the Hong Kong government were substantially reduced. The colonial regime could therefore afford the 'luxury' of enabling the colonized to enjoy a decent level of political freedom and human rights protection.

Lastly, being a place without natural resources, the colonial government had to exercise enlightened rule in order to attract and keep the people and capital needed not just for economic development of Hong Kong, but also for the fiscal revenue needed to maintain the colonial government itself.

All these factors *in toto* would counsel direct but light colonial governance. The colonial bureaucracy was in charge of directly administering the place. Coincidentally, the belief of the colonial officials in the doctrine of *laissez-faire* and social non-interventionism furnished the ideological underpinnings for the light governance practised by the bureaucracy. As the economy of Hong Kong -- propelled by private initiative and the capitalist market -- was quite successful, and the Chinese community was capable of coping with many of its problems, the colonial government was able to maintain limited, though continuously increasing, involvement in society and in the economy.

The nature of direct rule in Hong Kong is Janus-faced. On the one hand, the colonial government was highly jealous of its monopoly of political power. It was constantly on the alert as to any potential sources of political challenge from the Chinese populace. The colonial government would react with hostility to spontaneous emergence of competing or antagonistic political forces. They would be dealt with

decisively and vigorously. Before the 1960s, it was not uncommon for the colonial government to use harsh means to eliminate political threats.⁵ Before 1979, when the British began to realize that they had to eventually revert sovereignty over Hong Kong to China, they were very resistant to suggestions of political reforms in the territory which would diminish the political prerogatives of the colonial government. The British also wanted to prevent the emergence of pro-China or anti-China forces which would get Hong Kong embroiled in Chinese politics and hence jeopardize Hong Kong's neutrality *vis-à-vis* China. Besides, the Chinese established elites in Hong Kong were against political reforms which would threaten their privileged status. Though some piecemeal political reforms had been introduced, they were more window-dressing efforts than significant measures to change the political system.⁶

On the other hand, the colonial government had displayed tremendous capacity to adapt its methods of government to political and social changes in Hong Kong for the sake of forestalling political threats, stabilizing its rule and maintaining its political dominance. Most relevant to the development of indigenous political leadership was the cooptive strategy of the government, which involved the cooption of established and emergent Chinese elites into the colonial regime as its complementary but subsidiary components. Through appointment to the Executive Council, the Legislative Council, numerous advisory bodies and para-administrative organizations, and rewarding with various honors dispensed by Britain, the colonial regime obtained for itself a layer of indigenous collaborators, who played a significant part in maintaining and legitimizing colonial rule. The job of cooption by the colonial government was made easy by the process of Westernization which assimilated the Chinese elite to English culture,⁷ the congruence of interests between the colonial regime and the Chinese elites, the cravings of the mercantile Chinese elites for political recognition by the colonial authorities, and by the lack of a traditional literati-scholar class who would be more resistant to the absorptive tactics of an alien government.

The deliberate efforts of the colonial government to involve the Chinese elite as collaborators in colonial rule have variously been described as 'government by discussion,'⁸ 'the administrative absorption of politics,'⁹ or 'consultative government.' Over time, the system of elite cooption became more or less institutionalized, and the

colonial government was also flexible enough to adapt the system to changes in the social and political environment. By the early 1980s, the cooptive system had developed to such a stage that a system of political mobility was available to the political aspirants among the Chinese elite. Under the system controlled by the colonial government, there was a hierarchy of political appointments with the corollary gradations of status and influence. To the Chinese elite, it was possible to pursue a political quasi-career on the condition that they identified with the colonial system. Through the cooptive system, a condition of political dependence of the Chinese elite on the colonial regime was created. Though the colonial government had not been successful in stamping out all forms of dissent through cooption, the cooptive system had been highly successful in bolstering colonial rule. Quite a number of adversaries to the colonial government among the Chinese elite had been reshaped into supporters of the system.

A most significant feature of the cooptive system lies in the fact that it was basically the individual rather than the group who was coopted into the political system. Admittedly, the individuals themselves could somehow 'reflect' the views and interests of the social sectors and groups to which they belonged. But it was as individuals that they were recognized by the colonial government, and they were basically accountable to the government who awarded them the appointments. The cooptive system hence activated intense individual competition among the Chinese elite for colonial favors, and the outcome was fragmentation of the Chinese elite. From a developmental point of view, with the decline of the traditional organizations in the Chinese community, the targets of cooption by the colonial government had become increasingly individuals with professional or business achievements but whose linkage with the masses was minimal or non-existent. Thus, even though the colonial government had been successful in expanding its scope of cooption by inducting the elites of the new middle class into the system essentially dominated by big business,¹⁰ it was not capable of strengthening its relations with the masses. Nevertheless, intentionally or not, by individualizing and fragmenting the Chinese elite and by detaching them politically from the masses, the chance for the emergence of belligerent popular leaders in Hong Kong was minimized.

That colonial rule in Hong Kong was not contingent upon control of the masses through organizational mechanisms commanded by the

colonial government is another distinctive feature of Hong Kong as a colony. For instance, there was no 'government party' to solicit popular support for the colonial government. Even though mass mobilization and control were not prominent phenomena in other British colonies, Britain could still rely upon strong indigenous leaders as collaborators to control the masses and applied coercion to suppress anti-colonial activities. But there were no strong popular leaders in Hong Kong to serve as agents of indirect rule, nor was the coercive capacity of the colonial government sufficient to rule a place with a vast Chinese population and an independent and powerful Chinese nation close by. Unlike other colonies, however, the political 'subsidy' indirectly given by China, the apolitical predisposition of the Hong Kong Chinese, the atomistic Chinese community and the lack of threatening political forces made it unnecessary for the colonial government to control the masses through top-down organizational penetration into the Chinese community. In contrast with other authoritarian regimes, which mobilized their people for developmental and control purposes, the colonial government was much more conservative in its governmental goals. Both the economy and the Chinese community were allowed a high degree of autonomy, with the market and social customs playing significant roles in regulating the economy and the Chinese community respectively.¹¹ As a 'minimal state,' the colonial government did not have the capacity for organizational penetration into society. Moreover, being an administration run by career civil servants, the colonial government lacked the political skills and the temperament to mobilize and control the masses. From the point of view of leadership formation, however, the reliance on 'pure' bureaucratic rule and the inability and unwillingness of the colonial rulers to develop organizational linkage with the masses (even for control purposes) had negative impact on the rise of leaders in Hong Kong. Since the colonial government felt no need for popular leaders to support its rule, it would be under no imperative to groom leaders with mass bases. As a result, the major impact of the leadership 'policy' of the colonial government on leadership formation in Hong Kong was negative, for its primary intention was to impede the emergence of leaders with organizational linkage with the masses, to encourage individualistic competition among the Chinese elite for political patronage from the government and to establish a channel of political mobility for the Chinese elite which would foster their detachment from the masses.

Historical Background: The Chinese Community

The structure and character of the Chinese community did not provide the breeding ground for political leaders either. In this respect, the Chinese community complemented the colonial government in hampering the rise of political leaders. As a society made up of immigrants with a refugee or sojourner mentality, Hong Kong did not have community solidarity or strong feelings of community identification. Colonial rule was not harsh enough to forge a common identity among the colonized. There were no symbols or rituals in Hong Kong which could elicit emotions of togetherness among its people. Even though a majority of the Hong Kong people identified themselves as Hongkongese,¹² the Hong Kong identity was inchoate, fragmented, incoherent and unstable. It was built largely upon an assemblage of elements from Chinese ethnicity, the glorious Chinese past, the economic success of Hong Kong, the personality traits of its people deemed important to its economic success (diligence, intelligence, aggressiveness, innovativeness, adaptability, cosmopolitanism), and the lifestyle and life orientations of the people. The Hong Kong identity was basically economic and cultural in nature. It underlined the similarity of the Hong Kong Chinese in lifestyle and mental outlook. Conspicuously missing in the Hong Kong identity was the political dimension, for the Hong Kong people did not see themselves as necessarily sharing a common political fate. Nor was there affection for the community and concern for its well-being. In fact, Hong Kong Chinese affection for each other and their community was quite low. A sense of social commitment and social responsibility was not an intrinsic part of the Hong Kong identity. In the 1988 survey conducted by myself and others, it was found that respondents who identified themselves as Hongkongese (rather than Chinese) were more inclined to emigrate to other countries.

The Hong Kong identity was in a sense also a negative or residual one, for it basically indicated who a Hongkongese was not than who he was. The residual character of the Hong Kong identity was closely related to its comparative-reactive nature, as the Hong Kong people were prone to compare themselves with people in other societies and develop their self-image accordingly. They were particularly prone to contrast themselves with their fellow Chinese on the mainland, and they tended to exaggerate their positive features while denigrating

their mainland counterparts in the process. At the same time, being aware of the power disparity between themselves and China, the Hong Kong identity contained strong elements of political powerlessness and fatalism. As the Hong Kong identity was incoherent and comparative-reactive, it was bound to be unstable. It was not uncommon for the Hong Kong people to shift back and forth from an exalted sense of self-esteem to a dejected sense of self-pity in no time. Taken together, however, such identity did not have a strong core component and therefore could not form a solid basis for community solidarity and identification. Political leaders could not emerge or survive in the absence of a strong sense of community identification or in the absence of persecution. If the Hong Kong people did not recognize common interests or shoved them aside, they could not be depended upon to provide support to leaders who appealed to common interests or community needs.

People in Hong Kong basically identified themselves with narrow familial and other parochial interests.¹³ Social participation of the people was quite low, and they rarely identified with or actively joined social groups outside of the family. Though the overall trend of social and political participation was one of gradual increase, and the people had become somewhat more tolerant of unconventional forms of political actions (such as demonstrations, protests and marches), they still remained largely disinterested in politics.¹⁴

Hong Kong was essentially a loosely organized society composed of a vast collection of familial groups. There was also a proliferation of social organizations outside the family, and they varied in importance and cohesion. These organizations catered primarily to the narrow interests of their members, though they normally couched them in terms of common interests. Business and professional associations were particularly influential in a context of governmental non-interference in the market place. The peculiar nature of the Hong Kong economy, where small firms dominated the manufacturing sector and the ease with which workers could change jobs in a bid for better rewards militated against strong trade unions. As a matter of fact, not only were trade unions an ineffective means to further the common interests of the workers, but they were also incapable of cultivating a sense of class consciousness among the workers, who continued to see society as a nuanced gradation of statuses, perceive a lot of opportunities for upward mobility for themselves and their children and

tolerate existing economic inequalities.

In general, no social organization in Hong Kong could represent the Chinese community as a whole or serve as the focal point for building community solidarity. As a society of immigrants and their progeny who came and left in pursuit of material opportunities, Hong Kong had its settled population only about twenty years after the Second World War, when people came to realize that they were stuck in the place. Hong Kong, which began as a colony without preexisting leaders and dominant social organizations, would not have enough time to develop them to prepare for the shock of 1997 even if other factors were favorable.

Even though the rich people in Hong Kong enjoyed high social status and were the target of envy and emulation, there was a glaring lack of affection and respect for them. In a society where material possessions featured prominently as a criterion for assigning social ranks, the rich should logically have a legitimate claim to political hegemony and leadership. Nevertheless, this was not the case.¹⁵ This presumably was due to the fact that Chinese political culture imposed stringent moral demands on political leaders who were expected to place community interests above particular interests. The rich were commonly regarded as self-seeking, and as such had no natural 'right' to be political rulers.¹⁶ Moreover, unlike the bourgeoisie in the advanced industrial societies who had developed an elaborate set of symbols, rituals and ideologies to legitimize their political dominance, the rich in Hong Kong were still popularly seen as the *parvenu* rich immersed in crass materialism.

The claim of the middle classes to the right to rule was also fragile. The heterogeneous middle class, being beneficiaries of the open colonial-capitalist system, was basically conservative, privatist and disorganized.¹⁷ What was most distinctive about the class was the common consumption patterns and material aspirations of its members. Despite the increasing number of people with a liberal and reformist proclivity in the class, it was largely dominated by the professional-managerial elites in the private capitalist sector. Intellectuals with a critical faculty and moral courage were few in number and had limited political influence.¹⁸ There was no class consciousness within the middle class. Upward mobility through individual endeavor and interpersonal competition was the norm. Hence members of the middle class were not able to create an independent image of themselves

and develop an ideological critique of the status quo which would make them morally and culturally superior to the rich. In short, they did not have a distinct identity which would separate them from the rich and mark them out as natural and legitimate political leaders.

As a society of immigrants and their progeny, Hong Kong did not have the stratum of scholar-gentry who could lay claim to the right to rule based on traditional grounds. None of the existing social groups or strata in Hong Kong have been capable of establishing the kind of social, ideological or cultural domination or leadership over the rest of society that they could be regarded as a viable alternative to colonial rule. Therefore, with the imminent departure of the colonial rulers, whose rule was established before they came to Hong Kong, and the popular repulsion of direct rule by China, the people are deeply haunted by a specter of 'authority crisis.'

Structural Constraints on Leadership Formation

Both the nature of colonial governance and the character of the Chinese community posed insuperable obstacles to the emergence of indigenous political leaders on the eve of Sino-British negotiation over Hong Kong's future. These obstacles might to a certain extent be overcome if Hong Kong was overwhelmed by serious social, economic or political problems to create massive grievances in society or discontent with the government. Under such circumstances, there would be a strong demand for political leadership. However, the miraculous economic development of Hong Kong in the post-War period has dampened the possibility of mass movements challenging colonial rule and the concomitant rise of popular leaders. It has in fact strengthened the unity between the colonial government and its coopted elite collaborators, making the system less vulnerable to change.

The scheduled transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong and the termination of colonial rule present an unprecedented threat to the existing social-political system. As the colonial government of career civil servants owes its existence and allegiance to Britain, there is no need for it to rely on any social class or social group for legitimacy and survival. The capitalist nature of Hong Kong inevitably gives enormous political influence to the business sector, but the constitutional structure of the territory does not give it formal political power or offices.

On the contrary, there is a high degree of political dependence of the business sector on the colonial government, for there is no alternative to the latter as the ruler of Hong Kong (except of course China). Other sectors in the territory are also quite aware of the irreplaceability of colonial rule.

Thus, the concentration of formal political power in the colonial government, the appointive nature of civil servants, their security of tenure, the extremely low level of lateral entry of outsiders into the top echelons of the government, the limited extent of civil servants joining the private sector before or after retirement and the elitist bureaucratic culture underlie the structural political autonomy of the colonial government. The limited involvement of the government in social and economic affairs minimizes its dependence on other social groups in the running of the colony. The colonial government has also deliberately and wisely adopted some elements from traditional Chinese paternalism as guidance in its 'benign' authoritarian rule, thus tapping into sources of political legitimacy in the Chinese culture. The brilliant economic performance of Hong Kong in the post-War period naturally furnishes the colonial government with an autonomous source of prestige and legitimacy, which it can in turn confer to its collaborators. As a matter of fact, after more than one and a half centuries of colonial rule, the colonial bureaucracy has become politically self-perpetuating in the sense that civil servants transfer power to their successors after they have gone through bureaucratic socialization and have shared the mental outlook of their superiors.

The 'sudden' appearance of the 1997 issue and the scheduled termination of colonial rule threaten to create a condition of power vacuum at the top and a crisis of political authority in Hong Kong. Since the Sino-British negotiation over its future, there has been wrangling among Britain, China and a diversity of local political interests to shape the future political system of the place, which would determine the pattern of leadership recruitment, the type of leaders that would emerge and the relationship among the leaders. The end result of a prolonged and tortuous process of political infighting, as enshrined in the Basic Law of Hong Kong and as seen in the reform plans of the Hong Kong government, is a political system which in many ways bears striking resemblance to the existing system but at the same time introduces some significant changes (particularly the inclusion of an elective element in the selection of legislators and the

Chief Executive).¹⁹ The new system provides more opportunities for political mobility to the Hong Kong people; it in fact creates the possibility of pursuing a semi-career in politics. Nevertheless, the new system is not conducive to the rise of strong popular leaders with solidaristic ties to one another.

(1) The image of power vacuum created by the scheduled termination of colonial rule is illusory. As the possibility of an independent Hong Kong is ruled out, political power has to be transferred to China by Britain, and China is in a strong position to determine the way power is delegated to Hong Kong to realize her promises of a high degree of self-government and 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong.' Paradoxically, though the decline of colonial authority is inevitable in the transitional period, the Sino-British agreement on the future of Hong Kong serves to slow it down in two ways. In the first place, whereas previously China did not recognize British sovereignty over Hong Kong, the Sino-British agreement implies formal recognition of British rule over Hong Kong and obligates China to render support to the colonial regime in the transitional period. Secondly, in holding Britain responsible for the maintenance of stability and prosperity in Hong Kong, China has to make sure that the colonial government is not threatened or subverted by the emergent political forces in the territory which aspire to 'fill in' the 'power vacuum.' And, as the *de facto* holder of political power in the transitional period, the colonial government still has much theoretical latitude to distribute or transfer powers and allocate political patronage in accordance with its own political needs.

In fact, both before and after 1997, there will be no 'free-floating' political power available to the aspiring leaders in Hong Kong. Political power has to be obtained from Britain and China, though obviously it is the latter that is more significant. Both of them have also the right to reclaim it even after it has been delegated. Consequently, the condition of political dependency of Hong Kong's leaders on political forces above them is perpetuated. Political patronage from the colonial government, and increasingly from the Chinese government is a necessary, though not sufficient, requirement for effective leadership. Both governments have the theoretical prerogative and the actual capability of advancing or breaking the 'career' of leaders by increasing or decreasing the amount of power transferred to Hong Kong, by changing or distorting the rules of political competition, and by con-

ferring or withdrawing official support to individual leaders. It goes without saying that dependent leaders are bound to be weak leaders.

(2) The government of Hong Kong will continue to restrict its involvement in social and economic affairs. Most of the existing social, economic and cultural policies have been imported into the Basic Law and thus given constitutional status. Many socio-economic issues are removed from the public agenda and become depoliticized. Political leaders in Hong Kong will thus be seriously handicapped in articulating new socio-economic concerns and advocating changes in public policy priorities. Even though the Hong Kong people are status quo oriented, the fact that political leaders have to work within the confines of the status quo while Hong Kong is undergoing rapid changes does not augur well for them.

(3) Decision-making power continues to be concentrated in the hands of the career civil servants, who are responsible to the Chief Executive and in turn are shielded by him from legislative scrutiny and censure. Though the Chief Executive is to be elected by an election committee of 800 members from various socio-economic sectors, this electoral process is not conducive to the rise of strong popular leaders. As it is the elites who will dominate the electoral process, the need of the candidates to obtain support from the people is diminished. Because of the nature of the election, the Chief Executive can at most claim the *primus inter pares* status *vis-à-vis* other elite members, and his discretionary powers will be constricted. Moreover, it is quite likely that China's influence in the electoral process will be substantial. Most importantly, the fact that the Chief Executive has to be appointed by the Chinese government after the election means that China's endorsement is crucial to the ambitious politicians in Hong Kong.

The way the Chief Executive is to be selected and the preservation of the structure and functions of the civil service severely circumscribe the competitive political arena of Hong Kong. They also create a situation where political leaders have to depend for support on the Chief Executive and the civil servants, who control the bulk of public resources, in order to satisfy the demands of their constituencies. In short, the continued political dominance of the administrative apparatus will be detrimental to the production of strong political leaders.

(4) Among the major institutions in the new political system of Hong Kong, the legislature, which is to be constituted through elec-

tions, is the most likely place to foster popular leaders. However, the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature, the limited policy-making power of the latter, the meagre resources at its disposal and its limited oversight power would diminish its leadership formation capacity. What is most important in this connection is the institutionalization of two principles of leadership recruitment in the composition of the legislature. Until 2003, the legislature will be made up of three types of members: members returned by functional constituencies, members returned by the Election Committee (the same body which will elect the Chief Executive), and members returned by geographical constituencies through direct elections. At least until 2007, the proportion of directly elected members will not be more than 50 per cent of the total members in the legislature.

In light of the composition of the legislature, the two principles thus are:

(a) Multiple channels of recruitment of political leaders are established. In deference to the dominant elites in Hong Kong and as a result of China's apprehension about the arousal of anti-Communist sentiments, popular election is only one among several means of procuring leadership status. Recognition by socio-economic elites is even more important in the meantime and at least in the foreseeable future. The channels of popular election and elite recognition are basically incompatible, for reliance on populist appeals is bound to alienate the established interests.

In fact, the institutionalization of multiple channels of leader recruitment as embodied in the composition of the legislature can be further generalized. In the first place, the principle is also incorporated into the selection process of the Chief Executive through the Election Committee. Secondly, besides the legislature, political ascendancy can be obtained through appointment to the top echelons of the administrative apparatus and the numerous advisory and para-administrative bodies under the command of the current British Governor and the future Chief Executive. As a matter of fact, with the purposes of garnering elite support and circumventing China's opposition to expanding the electoral mechanisms (as a means of enabling the Hong Kong people to have some power to stand up against China after 1997) in mind, the colonial government has since the Sino-British Agreement resorted to the tactic of dispersing the limited amounts of power it would transfer to the Hong Kong people. There has been a

proliferation of independent boards and administrative authorities on specific policy areas. A number of advisory committees have been strengthened and granted a certain measure of decision-making influence.

Meanwhile, appointments by China to honorary and influential positions in committees and bodies in Hong Kong and in China (at both the local, provincial and central levels) represent a new and heatedly sought after channel of political recognition. Thus, ironically, at a time when popular election has become a channel of leader recruitment in Hong Kong, the significance of political patronage from above is further enhanced.

(b) The institutionalization of multiple channels of leader recruitment is closely related to the other principle of leadership formation. This is the principle of disparate bases of political influence. More specifically, the established interests in Hong Kong are given the means to directly convert their socio-economic power into political power without going through any political intermediaries. In other words, the dominant socio-economic groups and figures are granted direct access to public decision-making without having to organize or support political groups or form alliance with sympathetic leaders. The functional elections, the Election Committee and political patronage from both the colonial and Chinese governments represent channels to political recognition available to those with socio-economic status and power. As a matter of fact, through the cooptive system the colonial government has for a long time involved the dominant socio-economic interests as collaborators in colonial rule. An embryonic form of 'functional representation' can thus be said to predate the introduction of popular elections. Under the new system, the political influence of the elites are further expanded because of the functional and Election Committee elections. In the old colonial system, the dominant socio-economic interests are heavily dependent on official recognition, but under the new arrangements they even have a role to play in determining who the rulers of Hong Kong are.

The co-existence of both political bases (popular elections, appointments to administrative positions) and non-political bases (support by the dominant elites, socio-economic status and influence, and patronization by the colonial and Chinese governments) of political ascendancy has significant effects on leadership formation in Hong

Kong. In the first place, as the types of power within both the political and non-political bases and between them are neither comparable or compatible, it is very difficult to find a formula for creating agreement between leaders based on different types of power.²⁰ Unlike Western democracies, one cannot unambiguously determine the relative power of different leaders and groups by reference to votes cast in general elections because popular election possesses only moderate political significance in Hong Kong.

The inevitable outcome of multiple channels of leader recruitment and simultaneous existence of multiple bases of political power is structural fragmentation of political leaders. Leaders are thus able to expediently shift their bases of power and adopt alternative channels of political mobility in the pursuit of power and influence. Consequently, the dependence of individual leaders on particular political organizations is lessened.

On the whole, because of the constitutional entrenchment of the major public policies in the Basic Law, the structuration of the new political system of Hong Kong makes available through top-down transfer only a limited amount of usable political power for competition. The dispersal and fragmentation of the power transferred are not generative of solidarity among leaders. The institutionalization of the mechanism of direct conversion of socio-economic power into political influence further devalues the political channels of leadership formation and makes a professional political career less necessary or attractive to the politically ambitious. The dependence of leaders on political patronage from above further assures leadership fragmentation. In short, the structural configuration of the new political system of Hong Kong is not favorable to the production of strong political leadership.

The Constraint of Time

The constraint of time has an independent impact on the process of leadership formation and the character of political leadership in Hong Kong. The constraint of time manifests itself in several aspects: the lack of enough time to psychologically prepare the Hong Kong people for the imminent transfer of sovereignty, insufficient time to form and share a common interpretation of the future of Hong Kong, the

shortage of time to lay the groundwork for the grooming of political leaders by Britain and China, the limited amount of time available for the transition between the signing of the Sino-British Agreement in 1984 and the end of colonial rule in 1997, and the unrealistic anticipation of an impending 'power vacuum' among the political aspirants who rush to fill the 'power vacuum.' The constraint of time is subjectively perceived by the leaders, creating among them an image of a wide-open political game where anyone has approximately equal chance for success. It also instills in them an unsettling sense of urgency and a short-sighted political time horizon. Consequently an intense and relentless scramble for positions and power among the leaders breaks out.

(1) The sudden emergence of the 1997 problem in Hong Kong has caught the Hong Kong Chinese off balance and created psychological disarray among them. The preservation of the capitalist system and the provision for a high degree of self-government, as enshrined in the Sino-British Agreement and the Basic Law, should theoretically have settled for good the future of the territory. Nevertheless, the deep-seated mistrust of the intentions and capabilities of China, as well as the unpredictability of China's future, make Hong Kong's future exceedingly uncertain in the mind of the people. Alternative scenarios about the future of Hong Kong as part of China, spanning the spectrum from the most rosy to the most gloomy pictures, compete for popular attention. It is not uncommon for an individual to subscribe to conflicting views in rapid succession or simultaneously. Changes in China or in China's attitude toward Hong Kong trigger changes in public opinion on its future. Many people have experienced both emotional elation and depression since the appearance of the 1997 issue.

Still, despite repeated assurances by China, no consensus on Hong Kong's future or the way Hong Kong should conduct itself has been reached. The subjective resistance mounted by the Hong Kong people to the communist takeover has resulted in a negative and passive public attitude toward the future of the territory, further exacerbating the difficulty of consensus formation. The leaders of Hong Kong are also very much paralyzed by the lack of consensus among themselves. It would be futile for leaders to appeal for mass support when they themselves are unable to adopt a common position about their community which would inspire confidence, hope and pride. On

the other hand, presumably leaders can enhance their popularity by forging a consensus on the future of Hong Kong among the masses. But the lack of leaders on the eve of Sino-British negotiation over the future of Hong Kong made it impossible. In a context of pervasive diffidence and pessimism, a lot of time is needed for a consensus to unfold and provide a basis for the rise of effective and strong leaders, even if such a consensus would eventually assert itself. But time is not on the side of Hong Kong.

(2) It would be quite difficult for a leader to win popular trust among people with a weak sense of community identification. For a leader without an impressive track record of performance to convince the people that he can lead them out of political malaise would be a herculean task. The lack of a power vacuum in Hong Kong further denies leaders the opportunity to prove their mettle. Without leaders at the very beginning, it is quite difficult for Hong Kong to find its leaders within a short period of time to lead the people to tackle the issue of 1997.

(3) While the time for leadership formation is short, many people, lured by the illusory perception of 'power vacuum' and the weakness of incumbent leaders, rush to enter the political fray to declare their leadership intentions. The ladder of political success, so meticulously fabricated by the colonial government, is no longer the only channel for political ascendancy, and leaders associated with the colonial government thus lose part of their hegemony and status. The increasing irrelevance of the seniority rule in the Legislative Council bears witness to the decline of the 'old' politicians. The emergence of leaders with the blessing of the Chinese government poses serious challenge to the established leaders. The rise of leaders who appeal to public sentiments of pessimism and anti-communism or who advocate the need for democratization as a means to thwart Chinese interference in local affairs also makes its mark on the political scene. The challenge of the democratic activists in turn spurs the conservative leaders into action with the goal of maintaining the sanctity of the status quo.

Because of rapid changes in Hong Kong's situation and changes in its relations with Britain and China, leaders have to change their positions incessantly in order to stay in the political game. The haziness of the future of Hong Kong also necessitates continuous redefinition of the situation and reconstruction of future scenarios by the leaders.

However, it is quite difficult for leaders to anticipate political changes and adjust their positions accordingly and at the same time maintain public credibility. They are thus at the mercy of the vagaries of the political environment. On the other hand, there are ample opportunities for 'new' leaders to come forward and declare a political stance which is more 'appropriate' for the moment. Not surprisingly, what has transpired within a short period of time after the emergence of the 1997 issue is an uneasy coexistence of leaders belonging to different political camps and political 'generations.' They have different definitions of the future and the needs of Hong Kong, divergent attitudes and policies toward China, disparate conceptions of Sino-British and Hong Kong-China relations and conflicting political tactics to achieve their goals. Each of them has managed to find a niche in the political arena, though they differ in influence and degree of acceptance by China, Britain and the Hong Kong people. As it is not clearcut who will win at the end, each of them entertains high hope for his eventual victory. The sudden intrusion into the political fray of a multitude of political aspirants in a short period of time thus has resulted in fragmentation of political leaders.²¹

(4) There is also insufficient time for the leaders, who had no experience of working together in the past, to develop interpersonal trust. The subjective need of the leaders to entrench themselves in the political arena as soon as possible in a political game perceived as 'free-for-all' unleashes a ferocious struggle for power among leaders in a hurry. In a context where a hierarchical structure among leaders is barely existent, where the rules of the political game has not been established and where the role of the politicians has yet to be defined, the struggle among leaders is bound to be relentless. This in turn exacerbates the lack of interpersonal trust among leaders, making it difficult for political groups to maintain themselves and function effectively.

Hence, the constraint of time, as subjectively perceived by the leaders, has severely divided them and renders it difficult, if not impossible, for them to form stable ties.

Britain and China

The enormous importance of political patronage from Britain and

China to the formation of political leaders in Hong Kong signifies that, if they can act in concert in the development of local leadership, a stable basis for the rise of leaders would be laid. The Sino-British Agreement, in delineating the future of Hong Kong, should presumably be the foundation for cooperation in that area. However, the mutual suspicions between them, their different interpretations of national interests and the needs of Hong Kong in the transitional period and beyond, their different strategies of leadership promotion, and the vagaries of events in the territory and in Sino-British relations since the signing of the Joint Declaration have created conflicts between their approaches to leadership. Moreover, though on the whole the leadership 'policy' of Britain appears to be more consistent and stable than that of China, both have undergone significant changes and are sufficiently inconsistent as to hinder leadership formation. To a certain extent, the two governments have even undermined each other's effort at leadership promotion.

In the past, Britain had a role to play in shaping the post-independence leadership of her former colonies. This is because colonial governments can create conditions to facilitate the rise of particular categories of leaders. It can also act to destroy leaders who are deemed to be threatening British interests. As elaborated by Tony Smith:

[I]f a host of factors conspired to force an end to European overseas empires after 1945, in most cases the Europeans could nevertheless significantly influence this process by their attention to grooming their successors. For virtually every nationalist movement harbored a civil war whose divisions allowed the colonial authority a strong voice in local affairs. By deciding with whom they would negotiate, by what procedure they would institutionalize the transfer of power, and over what territory the new regime would rule, Paris and London decisively influenced the course of decolonization.²²

The national interests of Britain loom large in the type of leaders she would favor. '[S]o long as nationalists were not avowed Communists, or, unlike Mossadegh in Iran and Nasser in Egypt, did not appear to represent threats to basic European overseas interests, leaders in Paris and London could realistically hope to count on the pressures of economic development to create a strong working arrangement with European business. Instead, in some instances a strong

leftist nationalist was to be preferred to a compliant but incompetent collaborator.²³ As long as it is practicable, some form of electoral arrangement is used to anoint the successors to colonial rule, though it is not uncommon for Britain to use questionable means to insure the success of her favorites. For a variety of reasons, however, the degree of success achieved by Britain in cultivating successors in her former colonies and the ability of these successors to stay in power after independence have not been impressive, in spite of the tremendous political skills deployed by her in the last days of colonial rule.²⁴

The distinctive form of decolonization in Hong Kong, however, renders unreplicable past decolonization practices. As it is China rather than any political force in Hong Kong that will be the recipient of power transfer and it will be China that is in a position to 'protect' future British interests in the territory, Britain is severely constrained in her ability to groom leaders in Hong Kong. Equally important is the obligation of Britain to maintain effective rule in Hong Kong and to be held accountable for it by China. (In return, China promises to provide the necessary support.) Any significant move on the part of Britain to transfer power downward is likely to be interpreted by China as the wily tactics of the colonial ruler to shirk its responsibility. This means that in the transitional period, Britain has to make sure that its rule is not threatened by any political leaders or groups in the territory. Therefore, even if Britain harbors intentions to transfer part of its power to some selected people in Hong Kong to give the place a veneer of protection against Communist arbitrariness after 1997, she still has to give top priority to maintaining effective pre-1997 rule. The predominance of a short-term imperative to maintain colonial rule, her reluctance to share power with China in the transitional period and the limited ability to groom her successors explain much of the dilemmas in Britain's approach to leadership formation in Hong Kong.

In the first place, the fragmentation of the leaders of Hong Kong, which is the legacy of colonial cooptive practices, means that Britain cannot depend on strong indigenous leaders as supporters in the most difficult moment of its rule. What it can realistically do is to retain as much as possible the support of those socio-economic elites who have all along been its collaborators. It is also the hope of Britain that the established Chinese elites can be accepted by China as the post-1997 rulers of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Needless to say, they have to be better rewarded than previously if their support is

to be enlisted. Britain's decision to give 50,000 elite families full British nationality in the wake of the June 4 event in 1989 in China turns out to be the ultimate act of elite cooption for the sake of stabilizing colonial rule in the most turbulent moment in Hong Kong. But the erosion of the authority of the departing regime, the counter-cooptive tactics of the Chinese government and the availability of the electoral channel of political mobility continue to weaken the cooptive capacity of the colonial government. For those leaders who have political ambitions beyond 1997, a pro-British tag is the last thing they want. In view of the fact that, as the incumbent sovereign of Hong Kong, Britain still controls enormous patronage resources, it should be able to enlist the support of a collection of leaders whose political fate will be increasingly tied up with their political master. However, these leaders are diminishing in number and influence, and they are not likely to enjoy the trust of the Chinese government or the people of Hong Kong. Paradoxically, they might not even be much trusted by their British patrons either, for it is very natural for a departing government preoccupied with the national interests of Britain to impart full trust to leaders who might be vulnerable to patriotic appeals by China or to public demands to assert local interests. Therefore, their status as the post-1997 leaders of Hong Kong is fragile. As 1997 draws closer, the usefulness of these colonial collaborators to the colonial government will further depreciate. If Britain is to over-rely on colonial sympathizers as collaborators, there is no guarantee that the last few years of colonial rule will be effective and that exit in glory is possible. But if she is not to do that, the autonomy of the colonial government and its ability to advance British interests will be jeopardized.

Secondly, despite the Sino-British Agreement, there is serious mistrust between the two governments. The relation between them has experienced ups and downs since the future of Hong Kong was sealed. Britain has strong resistance to what it sees as interference by China in Hong Kong's affairs, and it is wary of Chinese intentions and machinations in the transitional period. Naturally, there is no strong incentive to cooperate with China in the grooming of leaders in Hong Kong, for fear that these people will become the Trojan horse that would play havoc with the autonomy of the Hong Kong government. Be that as it may, Britain is still shrewd enough to maintain a *modus vivendi* with the 'pro-China' leaders. This represents a form of official recognition of their influence. Their support for the colonial government is even

desirable occasionally. They can serve as a bridge between Britain and China. They might even serve as lobbyists on behalf of Britain in times of Sino-British conflict. In any case, the closer 1997 is, the more the support of China and the China-supported leaders is needed to buttress colonial rule. Some form of cooperation with China and the 'pro-China' leaders is unavoidable.

Thirdly, a certain degree of power delegation downward is needed by a government suffering from declining authority so as to appease the people. Some forms of democratization are deemed desirable by Britain. They would also serve to enable Britain to soothe her moral unease in transferring Hong Kong to a communist government without the consent of its people. At one point in time in 1984, Britain did attempt to bring about full democratization in Hong Kong and let the elective mechanism select the future leaders of the territory. But before long the extent of democratization nevertheless had to be scaled down drastically so as not to antagonize China and the vested interests in Hong Kong. China is very much concerned with the possibility of the stirring up of anti-communist sentiments, depriving Chinese sovereignty of substantive meaning, if power has already been given away to the people of Hong Kong. The vested interests are fearful of the undermining of Hong Kong's freewheeling capitalist order consequent upon democratization. Britain has also come to realize that democratization might threaten her rule in the transitional period. Thus, unlike other former British colonies, the electoral method cannot be the principal means of leader recruitment in Hong Kong. Still, Britain has been able to transfer a limited amount of power downward, principally to the established Chinese elite. But she has to do so by dispersing the power discreetly in fragments in order to avoid opposition from China and to prevent the rise of strong political forces in Hong Kong which might pose as her challengers.

Finally, even though the democratic activists are either too radical or too nationalistic in the eyes of Britain, she has some sympathy for them because of their anti-communist stance and their ardent support of the doctrines of liberalism, parliamentarism and rule of law, which are seen as invaluable legacies of colonial tutelage. At times Britain finds them politically useful as a means to counter the intentions and actions of China. Sometimes they are useful as an ally of the colonial government when it intends to adopt policies which are opposed by the vested interests in Hong Kong or by China. Even though

Britain has no intention to enlist the democratic activists as a major collaborator in colonial rule or to groom them as the principal future leaders of Hong Kong, she still encourages them, flirts with them, manipulates them and provides them with a niche in the political system in spite of the opposition from both China and the established elites of the territory.

In general, the British 'policy' of leadership formation is plagued by contradictory needs and inconsistent actions. Up to the present moment, the colonial government has not been able to lay the basis for the development of strong indigenous leaders who can work with China, garner support from the people and lead Hong Kong to meet the 1997 challenge. Its inconsistent leadership 'policy' has in fact the undesirable effects of weakening and dividing the leaders, alienating both the conservative elites as well as the democratic activists, and fueling the suspicion of China.

Compared with Britain, China's leadership 'policy' has failed even more dismally. This can be seen in the fact that China in 1990 has fewer leaders whom she can trust than in 1984, when the Sino-British deal on Hong Kong was struck. On the face of it, this should be surprising as China should have a clear idea of what kind of leaders is needed to operate the formulas of 'one country, two systems' and 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong.' As the future sovereign of the place she should be in a politically advantaged position to groom future leaders. Actually, while this is true to some extent, the situation is much more complicated.

Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of China and the designer of the formula of 'one country, two systems,' has set down in broad terms the qualities of the future leaders of Hong Kong. Essentially they should be patriots. Patriots are defined as those people who hold the Chinese nation in high esteem, support wholeheartedly the restoration of sovereignty over Hong Kong by the motherland, and would not do things detrimental to the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. As long as they have these qualities, they are counted as patriots. It does not matter whether they believe in capitalism, feudalism or even slavery-ism. Deng would not demand that they agree with the socialist system of China. What is required is that they love the motherland and Hong Kong.²⁵

The abstract leadership qualities specified by Deng, however, when translated into concrete requirements in a changing political

context and China's changing definition of the political situation and her political needs, are bound to lead to different interpretations. Moreover, a particular quality might be given priority at one time, but disparaged at another. As a result, China has failed to develop a stable 'policy' of leadership formation. The unstable and unpredictable 'policy' of China has unwittingly produced the opposite effects of hurting China's supporters and alienating Hong Kong's leaders from her.

Inasmuch as the Hong Kong people have strong mistrust of China, and are only slightly susceptible to nationalistic and patriotic appeals, China suffers from a congenital disadvantage in her efforts at grooming leaders who are acceptable both to herself and to the masses. Very naturally, China has reciprocal suspicion of the intentions of the Hong Kong people. As they have never been given the opportunity for self-government under colonial rule, and as some of the Chinese elites have also expressed doubt about the self-governing capability of the Hong Kong people, it is very logical for China to cast doubt on their ability to govern themselves. The formula of 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong' was proposed primarily because there was no alternative arrangements that would at once undermine public support for Britain, placate the Hong Kong people and stabilize the situation in Hong Kong when China decided to resume sovereignty.

But the adoption of the formula as the established policy of China does not automatically increase her confidence in the capability of the Hong Kong people in self-government. The exodus of the Chinese elite since the Sino-British Agreement, the confrontational stance adopted by the democratic activists, the intransigence of the Hong Kong people and their lingering preference for colonial rule definitely lower China's trust of Hong Kong. The mass rallies (including the unprecedented participation of the Leftists and the pro-China elements) against the Chinese government in the spring of 1989 have aggravated the mistrust between both sides. Under these circumstances, it would be very difficult for China to attract to her side leaders who can command public respect. On the other hand, leaders who are perceived as pro-China are quite vulnerable to public mistrust and ridicule. In consequence, China is not likely to be very enthusiastic or very confident about grooming leaders in the early years of the transition. After some initial setbacks, China might even have concluded that people who are acceptable to her and who can assume post-1997 leadership

cannot emerge until a few years before 1997, if in fact such people can be found at all. Therefore, hitherto China has made only halting and desultory efforts at promoting long-term political leadership.

Meanwhile, China is preoccupied with the complicated political issues specific to the transitional period. Given her suspicion of British intentions, which has intensified since the June 4 incident, China has been embroiled in continuous tussle with Britain before and after the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. The predominant imperative of China to counteract British 'conspiracies' and offensives has led to the subordination of her leadership 'policy' to short-term considerations and tactical calculations. Depending on situational needs, different types of leaders would be approached and their support sought. During the Sino-British negotiations, China made intense nationalist and anti-colonial appeals to the Hong Kong people in order to deprive Britain of public support.²⁶ At that time, China even wooed democratic activists with nationalist proclivities in her battle with Britain and the pro-British elites. After the future of Hong Kong was settled and the issue of the future political system came to the fore, China then undertook to rally support from the conservative interests (including the pro-British elements whose interests would be adversely affected by democratization) and the pro-China forces to thwart the intentions of Britain and the democratic activists. When Sino-British conflict and anti-China sentiments among the Hong Kong people reached a new level of intensity in the wake of the June 4 event, China had no alternative but to rely exclusively upon herself and the small number of pro-China leaders to limit her losses in a largely defensive battle against Britain, who took advantage of China's internal and external difficulties and stepped up efforts to pressure China to make concessions both to her and to Hong Kong.

In all, the preponderant obsession of China with the British threat has unwittingly driven her to adopt a short-term, exploitative and divisive approach to leadership. It also predisposes her to underplay the importance and relevance of the leaders, for fear that they would become the ally of Britain in the Sino-British tussle. Not uncommonly, many leaders feel slighted or rebuffed by China who is reluctant to recognize their autonomy from Britain or their qualification to speak on behalf of the people. In the end, China has alienated, antagonized or demoralized many leaders in Hong Kong.

Knowing very well the tacit objection of the Hong Kong people

to the restoration of sovereignty over the territory, China is particularly concerned about the stability of Hong Kong in the transitional period. With respect to political leaders, this concern has to do with the possibility of popular leaders inciting the masses against China or asserting local interests at her expense. Mass protests against the Daya Bay nuclear plant in 1986 have increased China's anxieties, and she is determined to prevent any hostile united front from being formed. In this connection, the rhetoric and activities of the democratic activists, which are geared to mass mobilization and play upon anti-China sentiments, are particularly alarming. Even though upon objective analysis the democratic activists have only limited support from the people, China has targeted them as a major adversary and devised her leadership 'policy' accordingly. The short-term goal of the 'policy' is the negative one of containing the influence of the democratic activists and frustrating their claim to leadership. To achieve this goal, China not only adopts a hostile stance against the democratic activists, but also mobilizes other leaders against them. In this context, the positive policy of fostering leaders receives only secondary attention.

In the end, China has scored substantial success in thwarting the goals of both Britain and the democratic activists. Nevertheless, as some of these goals are also shared in varying degrees by the people, China has also depleted the supply of leaders who are acceptable both to her and to Hong Kong. Since such leaders are in chronic short supply, they have been overused by China in her struggle with Britain and the democratic activists. They have projected an image too pro-China to be palatable to the public and thus lost their leadership appeal. Eventually, these leaders might even become China's liability.

Even if China is to launch an active policy of leadership promotion, she would still have difficulty doing so. In retrospect, this is because of the unprecedentedness of the way the political future of Hong Kong has been resolved, China's lack of experience in dealing with Hong Kong and instabilities in China herself. China thus cannot provide a stable anchoring point for the people who would like to attach themselves to Chinese patronage. In the past eight years, China had experienced changes in her understanding of the nature of Hong Kong and its needs, in the definition of her interests *vis-à-vis* Hong Kong, in the way Hong Kong's role in China's development is appraised and in her evaluation of Hong Kong as the bridge between China and the West. Changes in China's leadership, which inevitably

result in personnel changes among Chinese officials dispatched to Hong Kong, also contribute to incoherence and unpredictability in her leadership 'policy.' Although it can be said that China has shown particular preference for the civil servants and economic elites as the future governors of Hong Kong, changes in China's attitude toward Hong Kong and leadership changes in China in the past few years have already led to the decline of some promising leaders who have become victims of these changes due to their association with discarded viewpoints or disgraced Chinese leaders.

In point of fact, neither Britain nor China alone is capable of grooming leaders in the transitional period. Leaders favored by Britain have to be endorsed by China if they are to be taken seriously as the future rulers of Hong Kong. Leaders acceptable to China have to be inducted into the governmental apparatus by Britain in order to gain the necessary expertise and to demonstrate their leadership ability before the people. However, hitherto both parties have not been able to work together toward the goal of preparing Hong Kong to govern itself. Both parties have in fact independently pursued unstable and inconsistent leadership 'policies' which divide the leaders and jeopardize their political future. Furthermore, the tussle between them has not only the effect of inhibiting the rise of leaders, it has the much more adverse effect of destroying budding leaders who happen to stand on the wrong side at the wrong moment in the turbulent encounter between the two political masters. Once a leader has irreversibly alienated either of them, the prospect of his political career would be gloomy.

On the other hand, both governments, with a sufficient sense of security and political astuteness, have found no need to resort to suppressive techniques to deal with their adversaries. Incarceration or physical elimination of people perceived as threats to either government has not been heard of. This bespeaks of the little political clout of the so-called 'radicals' in Hong Kong and the aversion of the two governments to enhance their status by producing 'martyrs.'

Paucity of Popular Support

In spite of the enormous importance of political patronage from Britain and China, popular support from the people of Hong Kong still

constitutes a relatively autonomous basis on which leadership status can be obtained. Both Britain and China do pay heed to public opinion in Hong Kong whenever their fundamental national interests are not at stake. Leaders without a certain level of acceptance by the public are unlikely to be chosen by them as possible future leaders.

However, popular support for leaders is difficult to obtain. More unfortunately, the people's conception of leadership and their attitude toward the leaders are such that they do not provide a stable and favorable basis for popular leaders to emerge. Leaders who prefer or have to rely on mass appeals for their leadership claims, notably the democratic activists, have not infrequently found that mass support is so elusive, complicated, changeable and uncontrollable that over-dependence on it not only would court the displeasure of Britain and China, but would also lead to the demise of inept or imprudent leaders.

The structural looseness of the Chinese community in Hong Kong provides a poor organizational environment for the aspirant leaders. They cannot make use of existing organizations to reach the masses or mobilize them for political purposes. The weakness of social identity among the people poses almost insurmountable obstacles to leaders who are bound to appeal to issues affecting the community as a whole in order to assert their role as leaders. Under exceptional circumstances, the people might be brought together momentarily *en masse* by means of some symbols or rituals which can provoke emotional responses, it is however beyond the capability of the leaders to build large-scale organizations as the vehicle for sustained mass political actions.

The general acceptance of the colonial government and the status quo by the people and the absence of serious mass grievances or discontent make popular leaders redundant. The cooptive nature of leadership formation under colonial rule has left behind a great schism between the Chinese elite and the masses. Not unexpectedly, a moderate sense of cynicism permeates mass attitude toward the leaders. While their services are still noticed and appreciated, leaders are also publicly perceived as laboring for their own benefits and hence are not quite trustworthy. Affection for the leaders is minimal. In general, leaders are rarely considered as influential with the colonial government, and hence public ratings of their political importance is low. The appearance of the 1997 issue and the sudden intrusion of China into the local political scene as an overwhelmingly powerful

actor have further downgraded the political significance of local leaders in the eyes of the public. The abstention of Britain and China from persecuting the 'radical' leaders also deprive them of the chance to publicly demonstrate their courage and commitment which should help raise public respect (not necessarily trust). Furthermore, the people are prone to project their own paralyzing sense of political powerlessness to the leaders and relegate them to political irrelevance. Plagued by a strong sense of futility and defeatism, they are reluctant to support or follow leaders. If leaders resort to tactics which are widely perceived as being harmful to the status quo or disruptive of political stability, public reaction would be swift and unfavorable.

Despite public aversion to China, there is still severe limits to effective anti-China appeals. People are very cognizant of the dangers involved in confrontation with their future political master. They might appreciate those leaders who, by making scathing attacks on China, serve as outlets for venting their feelings of disaffection and frustration. However, they are realistic enough not to repose their future on them. For they know very well that confrontation with China will bring disaster to Hong Kong, and Chinese cooperation is needed if it is to remain a viable place to live. This sense of realism is also rooted in Hong Kong as a sophisticated modern society where 'irrational' appeals have only limited and fleeting impact.²⁷ Therefore, leaders who set too great store on the arousal of anti-China sentiments as the route to leadership will be treading on hazardous ground.

The murkiness of the future of Hong Kong has produced unsettling feelings of uncertainty and aimlessness. In this emotionally charged and confused atmosphere, volatility of mass sentiments is the norm. It is very difficult for leaders to comprehend the capricious psychological conditions of the masses, not to say shaping or manipulating them for political purposes. Consequently, it is more common for the leaders to follow the masses so as not to be cast aside than for them to guide and lead mass sentiments. But as mass sentiments can change easily and erratically and as leaders cannot follow suit without incurring accusations of misjudgment or opportunism, to follow mass sentiments as a way to establish leadership claims is highly risky. As a matter of fact, many leaders have become victims of mass whims.

It is quite paradoxical that when conditions for the emergence of political leaders are not favorable, the people however have imposed

more stringent moral demands. In Chinese culture particularly, political leaders are expected to set moral examples. They have to demonstrate commitment and dedication to their community and place collective interests above self-interests. As the people of Hong Kong are suffering from great anxieties and feelings of insecurity, it is very natural for them to expect their leaders to provide a sense of security and purpose. Only leaders who are able to demonstrate commitment to the well-being of the people, sincerity in sharing a common fate and possessing personal probity are likely to meet their expectation and win their trust. It thus comes as no surprise that 68.2 per cent of respondents in a Hong Kong-wide survey, conducted by myself and others in 1988, declared that they would not trust people with foreign passports or rights of residence in other countries as their political leaders (only 17.7 per cent would trust them), for they are quite naturally seen as shirking their duty to their 'community' and as such do not deserve public trust. The massive emigration of the elite and their scramble for foreign passports as 'insurance policies' are thus likely both to dampen further public trust in the leaders and reduce their number.

The acceptance of the status quo and the colonial government by the Hong Kong people inclines them to accept (not necessarily trust) leaders who are products of the prevailing social-political system. The population has reservations about the electoral principle as the principal channel of leader recruitment, though it feels that the inclusion of some elements of democracy is intrinsically desirable and might make it more difficult for China to interfere with local affairs. In addition, the resigned acceptance of China as the future sovereign also impels them to grant a modicum of acceptance to pro-China leaders. Consequently, the people of Hong Kong are favorably disposed toward multiple channels of leader recruitment, without realizing that they will produce fragmentation and division among leaders.²⁸ Moreover, by failing to assign precedence to popular election as the cardinal source of leadership legitimacy, they have in fact denied themselves the critical role of arbitrating the differences among leaders with different bases of legitimacy. The people themselves thus make it impossible for a strong and united leadership to appear.

Orientation and Behavior of Leaders

The nature of colonial governance, the loosely organized Chinese society, the 'compressed' subjective time frame, the unstable and incoherent leadership 'policies' of Britain and China and the inordinate difficulty of garnering reliable mass support together confront the aspirant political leaders of Hong Kong with an environment which is unstable and laden with contradictory demands. The mistrust among Britain, China and different sections of the Hong Kong society in particular make up an extremely complicated tangle of conflicting political forces. Incompetent leaders would easily be trapped and fail in their bid for leadership status. In these circumstances, fragmentation and division among the leaders are the logical outcome, which is largely reflected in their orientation and behavior. The individualistic and opportunistic character of the leaders in turn reinforces their fragmentation and division, which make them even less acceptable to Britain, China and the people of Hong Kong.

It is not surprising then to find that a political career is attractive to only a small portion of the Chinese elite. The miraculous economic performance of Hong Kong offers the elite ample opportunities for business and professional development. As social and economic status can, under existing and future institutional arrangements, be translated into political influence, to become professional politicians is not a must for those with political ambitions. The potential risks associated with political activities are widely perceived by the elite, particularly when most of them consider the Chinese government arbitrary and Chinese politics brutal. Many of them are of the opinion that as the ultimate powerholder, China is not likely to entrust the Hong Kong leaders with real power. This in turn dampens the attractiveness of a political career. The limited supply of political leaders in Hong Kong is further depleted by the large-scale exodus of the elite, whose English proficiency enables them to make a living in a number of advanced industrial societies. Just like the people of Hong Kong, the elite's sense of community identification and responsibility is generally quite weak.

The outlook of Hong Kong's political leaders is essentially that of amateur politicians, who do not want a political career, have no intention to give up for good their non-political pursuits, choose to see politics as basically a community service, and would like the public to see it that way. Such an attitude toward politics in a sense also echoes

the view of leaders in traditional China.²⁹ Under the public service conception of politics, the goal of gaining power and status for oneself or one's group presumably occupies only a secondary place. To have an image of a powermonger or to be considered as power-hungry is the last thing an amateur politician would want. To them, the term 'politician' is a derogatory one, as it is seen as the antithesis of someone who selflessly devotes himself to community well-being.

In the words of Baroness Lydia Dunn, perhaps the most successful coopted leader under colonial rule to date, is found a representative self-portrait of an amateur politician:

I'm really not a politician. I know it sounds very strange. People always raise their eyebrows when I say this. I do not consider myself a politician. One has to face political situation but that doesn't mean I'm a politician ... To me it has always been a form of public service. I give the best advice according to my conscience. I do this because I think that there is a responsibility for people like myself to give that advice and to help in a consultation process because Hongkong is my home. Hongkong has been good to me ... I want to give something back in return. That's the way I see my role.³⁰

It is difficult to determine to what extent the political leaders of Hong Kong really believe in public service as the cardinal value that guides their behavior. But the general impression is that most of them have their own interests very much in mind. In fact, a desire for public service and the pursuit of self-advancement can coexist comfortably. More importantly, even an amateur politician is prone to be elitist and individualistic. If his primary goal is self-advancement rather than the promotion of public interest, that is also quite natural. Even if he defines 'politics' as the advancement of the public interest and insists that the determination of public policy ought to be set deliberately rather than as the accidental by-product of a struggle for personal and party advantage, elitism and individualism would still be his hallmarks. 'The primary reward of politics to the amateur is the sense of having satisfied a felt obligation to "participate," and this satisfaction is greater the higher the value the amateur can attach to the ends which the outcomes of politics serve.'³¹ As the amateur politician is very likely to be adamant about his own definition of the public interest and satisfaction is derived from the realization of his 'ideals,' there is a tendency

for him to project his own image by insisting on particular lines of public action rather than submerging himself easily in group consensus. The fact that the amateur politician can always fall back on his main occupation if he suffers from unbearable political frustration enhances this individualistic inclination.

The amateur political outlook is also strengthened by the very nature of untrammelled capitalism in Hong Kong. 'In competitive societies, the investing, calculating, transacting, risk-taking quality of politics may attract individualistic, entrepreneurial types of personalities who bring to politics the ethics and the practices of laissez-faire capitalism -- with crucial implications for policy-making and political leadership.'³² This is vividly true in Hong Kong.

When colonial authority is strong and dependency on colonial patronage is unavoidable, the fissiparous tendency of amateur politics can be contained through careful selection of cooptees who share similar political values. But with a weakened colonial government and the availability of alternative channels of political mobility, its divisive impact can no longer be checked.

Most of the political leaders recruited from the established elite fall into the category of amateur politicians, which is natural. But the democratic activists are also tainted by amateurism in spite of their avowed belief in ideological convictions and principled approach to politics. It is reasonable to expect that as outsiders to the power who are forcing their way into the ruling circles, and as the victims of various forms of discrimination by Britain, China and the established elite, the democratic activists should be able to form a cohesive and combative political organization. But this is not exactly the case. Even supporters of or sympathizers with the democratic cause in Hong Kong have deplored the fragmentation of the democratic activists and the endemic conflicts within their ranks.³³

Reasons for divisions among the democratic activists are legion and not difficult to find. Generally speaking, like the leaders with moderate or conservative colorations, democratic activists are also victims of the fractionating effects of the factors we have discussed above. There are in addition several explanations specific to their case. Firstly, the democratic leaders come largely from the elites and sub-elites of Hong Kong and they share much of their elitist and individualistic outlook. Secondly, the democratic movement is composed of a loose collection of autonomous civic, community and

single-issue groups which proliferated in the seventies and the eighties and aimed at redressing social injustice of different genres. They have become increasingly politicized with the appearance of the 1997 issue. To them has been added a large number of small-scale political groups with more explicit political goals. Factionalism and personalism are pervasive in such a context of atomistic organizational development.³⁴ Thirdly, in terms of goals and tactics, the democratic activists are a more heterogeneous collection of people than the status-quo oriented leaders. Controversies over class analysis, position with respect to the three governments, cooperation with the established interests, nationalistic stance, pace and type of democratization, and social reforms are long-standing divisive issues in their ranks. Fourthly, being by and large the beneficiaries of the existing system, they lack the deep-seated discontent or grievances to become uncompromising opponents of the system. They tend to waver between remaking the system or seeking self-advancement within it. As such they do not have the ferocious commitment to radical ideals, and thus cannot benefit from the unifying effects of the latter.

Fifthly, the large proportion of intellectuals or people with intellectual orientations within their number have brought about a lot of petty controversies and fights. The fragmenting effects that ensue is further exacerbated by the individualistic and uncompromising character of 'intellectuals.' Sixthly, the democratic leaders, despite their strident appeal to the people, enjoy a fair amount of public sympathy but only limited popular support. They have attained only meagre success in organizing the masses under their leadership and involving them in sustained political actions. The unifying and disciplinary functions that can be performed by strong mass-based organizations are thus denied the democratic leaders. On the contrary, the need to appeal to the amorphous and volatile masses intensifies the conflict among democratic leaders in their individual attempts to anticipate, shape, lead or not to lag behind erratic changes in mass attitudes and behavior. Seventhly, in reality, the democratic leaders are dependent on the support and voluntary help of a small number of activists who are much more 'radical' than the general populace. It is they who form the organizational backbone of the democratic movement and hence leaders have to make sure that they do not become estranged. As a result, there is a tendency for leaders to try to outshine other contenders in the movement by resorting to more idealistic or radical

appeals, which in turn brings about more intense rivalries between groups and leaders in the democratic camp. Lastly, in the absence of persecution by Britain or China, the democratic leaders find themselves in a politically and personally safe environment. Such an environment is not favorable to strengthening in-group feelings.

Fragmentation and division of Hong Kong's leaders are reflected in their behavior, the relations among them and the style of their leadership. Some of the more prominent features can be briefly described.

(1) Most of the leaders appear to be mainly concerned with the elevation of their social status rather than with the achievement of policy goals.

(2) Leaders are changeable and mercurial. Principled behavior is rare, though the democratic leaders appear to be somewhat more stable and consistent in their words and actions than their moderate or conservative counterparts.³⁵ Opportunism and short-term calculations dominate the tactics of many, which in turn undermine their acceptability to Britain, China and the people of Hong Kong.

(3) Interpersonal trust and mutual respect among leaders are limited. In fact, most of them harbor cynical attitudes toward their competitors. They engage unremittingly in mutual attacks, mudslinging and backbiting both openly and behind the scenes. As a way to knock down their enemies and ingratiate themselves with the power-holders, leaders are also accustomed to mutual backstabbing before Britain and China.³⁶ As such they have inadvertently produced 'mutual delegitimation' in the eyes of others.

(4) There is no commonly recognized hierarchy of power and influence. There is a shortage of leaders with the necessary respect and authority to arbitrate between competitors, to contain their conflict, or to serve as the core for solidaristic political organizations.

(5) Because of the general acceptance of the status quo by the people and the leaders of Hong Kong, the ideological distance between the conservatives and the 'radicals' is in fact quite narrow. As a result, the identities of different groups tend to overlap and the boundaries between them are blurred and fluid. Therefore, there is a strong need for each group to maintain its political distinctiveness. This need is compounded by the fact that as many political groups also aspire to be 'interclass' parties, they are competing for the same social base. Under these circumstances, they find it expedient to project sharply

contrasting images, striving to increase the ideological distance between their differences. But they do so less through specific policy commitments than through exaggerated rhetoric, manipulation of ideological symbolisms, mutual recrimination in the mass media, and most important, by an adamant refusal to compromise or cooperate with each other.

(6) Stable alliances among leaders are difficult to forge and splits among them are frequent. In many cases alliances are formed in an opportunistic manner concerned mainly with access to power for their members. Even political groups are formed as grudging and precarious expedients by individuals who would rather reach power by themselves. In many cases, because other differences are not present, each alliance or group tends to be distinguishable from the others only by the personalities of its members and by their relationship to power at the time. A sudden perception of imminent crises originating outside of or within Hong Kong might temporarily draw them closer together. But once the crises are perceived as abated or over, the alliances would lapse or fall apart.³⁷ The attempt in 1989 of a group of conservative, moderate and 'radical' leaders to formulate a compromise political model was triggered by the June 4 event in China, which created a sense of crisis in Hong Kong. But even so the compromise was shaky from the very beginning as they failed to resolve the basic differences among themselves. The personal interests of the leaders involved in the process of negotiation were also obvious hurdles along the way. When China refused to honor the compromised political model, no follow-up actions were taken by the parties concerned. Instead, they went their own ways and started bickering again.³⁸

(7) In the intense struggle among politicians for attention and status in a context of limited political organization, each of them also has to project his unique popular image in order to outmaneuver other contenders. There is a race for mass media exposure and the need to seek publicity is overwhelming. Political rhetoric with large dosage of sensationalism is used liberally. To criticize and attack the British, Hong Kong and Chinese governments, particularly the latter, is an often used means to woo the masses. Consequently, expressive 'leadership,' which serves primarily the cathartic function of venting mass frustration and grievance, is so far the most 'successful' type of leadership supplied by leaders, particularly those with democratic or radical

convictions. Unfortunately, such leadership is inimical to the relations among the three governments and the people of Hong Kong.

(8) There is a high 'mortality' rate among leaders. As leaders basically react and adapt to changing political situations which are beyond their control or even beyond their comprehension, sudden twists in the political environment throw contenders out of the political game.

(9) There is a lack of strong political organizations with stable and organized mass support. Organizational discipline in existent political groups is generally weak. Most leaders are not interested in the low-profile tasks of administration and development of their groups, thus exacerbating the weakness of their organizations. In this respect the democratic activists are again doing somewhat better than the established elite.

Concluding Remarks

The poverty of trusted leaders is part and parcel of the 1997 malaise of Hong Kong. Its adverse impact can be sorely felt in many areas. Without trustworthy leaders, the people of Hong Kong are deprived of a focus for community building and a reason to develop confidence in themselves and in the future of their society. Few people can mediate between Britain, China and the Hong Kong. The escalating conflicts within Hong Kong itself are becoming more and more difficult to manage, as few respected leaders can perform the mitigating, moderating or mediating function between contending forces. The declining authority of the Hong Kong government cannot be bolstered by a group of leaders committed to the future of the place, nor can China depend upon them to run it after 1997.

In the future, it is likely that some conditions affecting leadership formation in Hong Kong will improve. A process of community building might have already taken place among those who for various reasons have to stay in the territory beyond 1997. The closer 1997 is, the greater the need is going to be felt by both Britain and China to work in tandem to facilitate the rise of leaders. The inevitable gradual exit of Britain from the political scene will 'simplify' the political situation as well as the rules of the political game, making the life of leaders easier. The high turnover of contenders in the past should also

serve the useful purpose of alerting future leaders of the pitfalls that should be avoided in the unique context of Hong Kong, raising their political maturity and instilling in turn a more long-term political perspective. The introduction of popular elections should strengthen political organizations, reduce the degree of fragmentation among leaders and improve organizational linkage between leaders and the masses. The gradual incorporation of the democratic activists into the political system should lessen their hostility to Britain, China and the established interests of Hong Kong. Come 1997 and the degree of political realism and pragmatism of the people of Hong Kong will increase, making emotional appeals by leaders less effective. This should then make it less difficult for leaders to mediate between the people and China or to compose the differences between the leaders themselves.

Still, in the foreseeable future, the factors accounting for fragmentation and division among leaders will remain in force, and it is unrealistic to expect the emergence of strong and organized political leaders in Hong Kong before 1997. Hong Kong will still have to live with individualistic leadership and its implications for the operation of the political system. Nevertheless, in the near future, there are some factors which can alleviate somewhat the negative effects of fragmented political leadership. The common fear of China among the leaders and the people, public acceptance of the status quo and the way it operates, the continued dominance of the civil service and the incorporation of the fundamental social and economic policies into the Basic Law thus can set limits on political controversies and thus contain political conflicts among leaders. These factors should give Hong Kong the desperately needed breathing time in its painful search for leaders.

Notes

- ¹ See *A Draft Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong Government Printer, 26 September 1984); and *The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China* (Hong Kong: The Consultative Committee for the

Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, April 1990).

- ² See 'Institutions Without Leaders: Hong Kong Chinese's View of Political Leadership,' *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.63, No.2 (Summer 1990), pp. 191-209. Similar findings were obtained in a survey commissioned by a public affairs magazine. See *Hong Kong Herald*, No. 1 (December 9, 1989), pp. 13-16.
- ³ According to Michael W. Doyle, 'Imperial strategies, though playing on a common theme of divide-and-rule, varied as well. The metropole usually sought a path of imperial development which joined metropole and current collaborators to restrain the masses while winning over parts of the newly mobilized. This was Lord Lugard's strategy of the dual mandate.' See his *Empires* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 363. Lord Lugard was the foremost advocate of indirect rule in the British colonies.
- ⁴ The resistance put up by the residents of the New Territories to colonial rule when Britain assumed control of the place starting in 1898 is a minor exception.
- ⁵ The government's treatment of the pro-Communist and pro-Nationalist elements as well as the protest actions of the people in the past was illustrative in this regard. The curtailment by the government of the power and status of the Tung Wah Hospital (which represented the spontaneous organization of the Chinese elite and was trusted by the people of Hong Kong and the Chinese government) furnishes another telling example. See Ian Scott, *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Elizabeth Sinn, *Power and Charity: The Early History of the Tung Wah Hospital, Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989).
- ⁶ See Scott, *Political Change*; Norman J. Miners, *The Government and Politics of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, various editions) and 'Plans for Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong,' *China Quarterly*, No. 107 (Sept. 1986), pp. 463-482; and Steve Yui-sang Tsang, *Democracy Shelved* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988).
- ⁷ The British political culture and way of life had attracted admiration from many within the British Empire, particularly the rule of law, reasoned parliamentary debate, the 'gentlemanly code,' and so on. See Paul Kennedy's 'Why Did the British Empire Last So Long?' in

his *Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945* (London: Fontana Press, 1983), pp. 197-218.

- ⁸ G. B. Endacott, *Government and People in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1964), p. 229.
- ⁹ Ambrose Yeo-chi King, 'Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grassroots Level,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 15, No. 5 (May 1972), pp. 422-439.
- ¹⁰ Scott, *op. cit.*; S. N. G. Davis, 'One Brand of Politics Rekindled,' *Hong Kong Law Journal*, Vol. 7, Pt. 1, 1977, pp. 44-88, and 'The Changing Nature of Representation in Hong Kong Politics,' in Kathleen Cheek-Milby and Miron Mushkat (eds.), *Hong Kong: The Challenge of Transformation* (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1989), pp. 36-76.
- ¹¹ Lau Siu-kai, 'Social Change, Bureaucratic Rule, and Emergent Political Issues in Hong Kong,' *World Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (March 1984), pp. 544-562.
- ¹² See Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, *The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1988), pp. 178-186. In the 1988 Hong Kong-wide survey conducted by the author and others, 63.6 per cent of respondents chose to identify themselves as Hongkongese.
- ¹³ I have coined the term 'utilitarianistic familism' to characterize the ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese. With the gradual weakening of the Chinese family in Hong Kong, a more individualistic version of utilitarianism and instrumentalism can be discerned. See Lau Siu-kai, *Society and Politics in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1982), and 'Social Change,' *op. cit.*
- ¹⁴ Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, 'The Changing Political Culture of the Hong Kong Chinese,' in Joseph Y.S. Cheng (ed.), *Hong Kong in Transition* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 26-51; and their *Ethos*.
- ¹⁵ In a 1985 survey of a locality in Hong Kong, only 32.4 per cent of respondents agreed with the remark that 'only those with prestigious occupations and who excel in them can make good leaders.' (See Lau and Kuan, *Ethos*, p. 107.) In the 1988 Hong Kong-wide survey, only 35.7 per cent of respondents had trust in business leaders as political leaders (See Lau, 'Institutions Without Leaders,' *op. cit.*). Hong Kong Chinese were capable of differentiating between the political and economic realms, and they looked for different

qualities in political and economic leaders.

¹⁶ Japan provides a case where the conservative politicians have no roots in a religious or class base which might confer legitimacy. Politicians are political marginals, and are forced to use material appeals to bolster their standing at home. See Kent E. Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 62. In Sierra Leone, the Creoles have articulately cultivated a cult of elite-ness, which emphasizes their 'cultural' excellence, as the means to legitimize their rule over the country. See Abner Cohen, *The Politics of Elite Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

¹⁷ In societies where the conservative forces are strong and the middle class is the beneficiary of the status quo, middle class radicalism will not find fertile soil for development. See for example Thomas R. Rochon and Michael J. Mitchell, 'Social Bases of the Transition to Democracy in Brazil,' *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (April 1989), pp. 307-322; Peter McDonough, 'Repression and Representation in Brazil,' *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (October 1982), pp. 73-98; James J. Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); and Tun-jen Cheng, 'Is the Dog Barking? The Middle Class and Democratic Movements in the East Asian NICs,' (Mimeographed, 1989).

¹⁸ Cf. Edward Shils, 'The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States,' *World Politics*, Vol. 12 (1960), pp. 329-369.

¹⁹ See Lau Siu-kai, 'The Unfinished Political Reforms of the Hong Kong Government,' in John W. Langford and K. Lorne Brownsey (eds.), *The Changing Shape of Government in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Victoria: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1988), pp. 43-82; and *Basic Law and the New Political Order of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Centre for Hong Kong Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1988).

²⁰ A comparable case can be found in Latin America where power contenders based on disparate power capabilities engage in intense infighting. Not all elites accept the constitutional norms of election as definitive. In fact, democratic election is really only relevant to those who possess certain specific skills and support, those who have the capacity to aggregate consent through political parties and movements and the instruments of mass communication. Insofar as

there are other contenders in the political arena, whose power is not dependent on popular support at all (the economic elites and the army), elections are but a measure of power and not a means of determining who governs. See Charles Anderson, *Politics and Economic Change in Latin America* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967); and Douglas A. Chalmers, 'Parties and Society in Latin America,' *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer 1972), pp. 102-128.

- ²¹In many former colonies, the time available for formation of political leaders prior to independence was comparatively speaking more sufficient. A smoother succession of leaders with different orientations and capabilities was thus made possible, sparing these societies from the strife among leaders belonging to different generations. India and Tunisia are two noteworthy examples of orderly leadership succession. The early leadership in the Congress Party of India was provided by the Western-educated, upper-class political moderates, who embraced British rule but also demanded mild reforms in the parliamentary and constitutional direction. This leadership was eventually displaced by a newer generation of Western-educated Indians coming largely from lower-income levels of society and finding it hard to secure gainful and respectable employment after completing their education. They demanded the end of colonial rule and radical changes in the social-political system. See for example Robert I. Crane, 'The Leadership of the Congress Party,' in Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker (eds.), *Leadership and Political Institutions in India* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1959), pp. 169-187; and Richard Sisson and Stanley Wolpert (eds.), *Congress and Indian Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). In Tunisia, there was a succession of the old beylical elite, the urban bourgeoisie and the French-educated elites before independence. See Lisa Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). Algeria represents an extreme case of rapid appearance in succession of leaders with different definitions of the political situation, as well as different goals and strategies. There was a discontinuous process of political socialization whereby each political generation was exposed to different experiences while at the same time reacting to what was widely perceived as the failure of the preceding generation to achieve any of its major political goals. This produced deep

divisions within the elite which had not been successfully resolved. See William B. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969).

²² *The Pattern of Imperialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 132-133.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

²⁴ See for example Brian Lapping, *End of Empire* (London: Granada Publishing, 1985).

²⁵ Deng Xiaoping, *Building Socialism With Chinese Characteristics* (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., Expanded Edition, 1987), p. 44.

²⁶ Chalmers Johnson, 'The Mousetrapping of Hong Kong: A Game in Which Nobody Wins,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIV, No. 9 (September 1984), pp. 887-909.

²⁷ The argument of Edward Shils is relevant to Hong Kong. He is of the opinion that a sober, task-oriented and professionally responsible stratum of population and their prosaic matter-of-factness are essential as a matrix which can absorb the shocks of demagoguery, temper its winds and perhaps even moderate its resonance. See his 'Demagogues and Cadres in the Political Development of the New States,' in Lucian W. Pye (ed.), *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 64-77.

²⁸ Lau, 'Institutions Without Leaders,' *op. cit.*

²⁹ In Chinese culture, leaders have 'a commitment to public service (if not exactly to politics), with a tendency to define service to the state in terms of service to the people. Another is the notion that it is the duty of the educated person to act as spokesman for the people to those with power. The people may give voice to their own discontent as well, but the resolution of their discontent, according to the ethos, is perhaps better left to those with knowledge and insight.' See Peter R. Moody, Jr., 'The Political Culture of Chinese Students and Intellectuals,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 11 (November 1988), pp. 1141-1142.

³⁰ Fanny Wong, 'Lady Dunn Still Backs Consensus,' *South China Morning Post*, July 3, 1990, p. 17.

³¹ James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 4.

³² James M. Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1978), p. 124.

³³ See for example Joseph Y. S. Cheng, 'The Democracy Movement in Hong Kong,' *International Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 449-450 and his 'Democrats Have Lost Their Way,' *South China Morning Post*, March 4, 1989, *Review* section, p. 6; Margaret Ng, 'Democratic Leaders Have Lost Direction,' *South China Morning Post*, December 6, 1988, p. 35; Emily Lau, 'Democratic Malaise: The Colony's Liberals Remain Divided and Ineffective,' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 14, 1989, p. 38; John Young, 'The Democratic Movement of Hong Kong Revisited,' *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, December 21, 1989, p. 19; Lu Fanzhi, 'Dramatic Changes in the Political Situation and the Predicament of the "Liberals",' *Ming Pao Daily News*, September 28, 1989, p. 29 and his 'The "Moderates" and the "Radicals",' *Ming Pao Daily News*, March 26, 1990, p. 24.

³⁴ See Lee Ming-kwan, 'The Burden Given to the Liberals by the Pressure Groups,' *Hong Kong Economic Times*, September 20, 1989, p. 19.

³⁵ Leaders' changing positions with respect to the future political model of Hong Kong and other matters are publicly deplored. See *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, January 23, 1990, p. 5; January 30, 1990, p. 18; February 7, 1990, p. 5; and April 26, 1990, p. 18. Also see *Hong Kong Herald*, April 14, 1990, pp. 10-13.

³⁶ The case of Hong Kong is comparable to Korea as described by Henderson in the following words: 'The physics of Korean political dynamics appears to resemble a strong vortex tending to sweep all active elements of the society upward toward central power. Weak horizontal structure and strong vertical pressure complement each other.' See Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 5.

³⁷ Michael Burton and John Higley have listed five conditions for elite settlement: (1) a major crisis which provokes elite action, (2) face-to-face, partially secret negotiations among paramount leaders of the major elite factions, (3) the predominance of experienced political leaders, (4) considerable autonomy of the elites from mass followings and pressures, (5) compromising moderates being able to mobilize widespread nonelite support against intransigent elite persons and groups. ('Elite Settlements,' *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 52 (June 1987), pp. 295-307.) It is evident that most of these conditions are not available in Hong Kong. See also their 'The Elite

Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdown,' *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 54 (February 1989), pp. 17-32; Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); and Daniel H. Levine, 'Paradigm Lost: Dependence to Democracy,' *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April 1988), pp. 377-394.

³⁸ See for example *South China Morning Post*, December 27, 1989, p. 5, January 6, 1990, p. 2 and January 13, 1990, p. 5; and *Hong Kong Herald*, January 13, 1990, pp. 4-6.

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沒有獨立的非殖化及香港政治領袖的匱乏

劉兆佳著
(中文摘要)

香港在主權移交之前夕，受到政治領袖短缺及無能之困擾。造成政治領袖匱乏的因素為：(1)殖民地管治之性質、(2)華人社會之特性、(3)本地社會及政治體系之制度特徵、(4)時間的限制、(5)中英兩國政府的矛盾的及不連貫的領袖政策與(6)羣衆對領袖的支持的不可捉摸性和反覆無常性。這些因素的總體效果為：(1)領袖召募渠道的多元化、(2)此等渠道對強大領袖形成之不足性、(3)領袖之分化及不穩定、(4)領袖對來自上方的政治恩寵的高度倚賴及(5)個人化的領袖行爲。

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